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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, we analyze the effect of Executive Order 13269 on noncitizen 
enlisted accessions to the U.S. military as a whole and to each of the Services 
individually. The Defense Manpower Data Center data used in the study covers 
1,983,707 enlisted prior and non-prior service accessions from fiscal year (FY) 
2000 to FY2010. In order to analyze the policy effect, we aggregate the data to 
reflect monthly citizen and noncitizen enlisted accessions. An Ordinary Least 
Squares Regression using difference-in-difference estimation is adapted to 
reveal the effect of the policy.   
The results of the regression analysis show that the decrease in 
noncitizen accessions is greater than the decrease in citizen accessions after the 
executive order was implemented. The results of the analyses conducted by 
using data on the services support these results, except for the Coast Guard.  
We conclude that the executive order either had no effect or a negative 
effect on noncitizen enlisted accessions to the military, and we propose several 
policy recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the executive order.  
The first recommendation is to establish an effective way of recruiting 
noncitizens by briefing the recruiters in the Services about the executive order 
and its current benefits to the United States and to noncitizens. After looking at 
news articles to see how Executive Order 13269 was perceived and debated 
within society, we recommend expanding the efforts to advertise the executive 
order since most discussion of the order is negative. The benefits provided by the 
executive order should be broadened to include family members, while some 
requirements might be loosened to attract more noncitizens.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The readiness of the armed forces strongly relies on the level of manning 
as well as some other factors such as training, manpower quality, and technology 
(Cyrulik, 2004). Considering the current roles assumed by the U.S. military at 
home and in the international arena—homeland security, deterrence missions 
around the world and the operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans—
together with the ongoing conflicts within nations and between nations and 
continuing terrorist activities all over the world, the need for the expansion of the 
armed forces, or at least maintaining the current level of manning, is projected to 
remain as one of the challenges the military should deal with in the foreseeable 
future (Cyrulik, 2004). Recruiting and retaining service members are the two 
major components of maintaining and improving the manpower level of the 
armed forces (Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 2006). 
After the implementation of an all-volunteer force in the U.S., different 
policies were implemented to attract the people of the country to fulfill the 
recruiting goals of the military. Much research has been conducted to measure 
the effectiveness of these policies. When fulfilling manpower requirements, the 
armed forces must consider every possible source to attract more qualified 
recruits. Noncitizens can be considered as one of these specific sources. 
Noncitizens compose an important and valuable pool of applicants for recruiters 
for several reasons, including the following: Noncitizens have cultural 
backgrounds and language skills that would improve diversity in the armed 
forces; they have superior performance in the military, as expressed in retention 
and attrition rates when compared to U.S. citizens; and recruitable noncitizen 
population is increasing (McIntosh, Sayala, & Gregory, 2011). 
Throughout the history of the U.S., the flow of people in search of better 
opportunities has never stopped. During wars and conflicts in U.S. history, 
considerable numbers of people coming to the U.S. have helped to respond to 
the manpower needs of the military. The service history of noncitizens and 
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immigrants in the U.S. military goes back to the Revolutionary War (Plascencia, 
2009). Noncitizens have made valuable contributions in the forming of a new 
nation and establishing the security and welfare of the country by serving in the 
armed forces since the Revolutionary War (Stock, 2009). Awarding citizenship in 
return for military service has been a tradition since that time (Plascencia, 2009).  
A. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this study is to assess the number of noncitizen 
accessions in the U.S. military before and after the implementation of Executive 
Order (EO) 13269 issued on July 3rd, 2002, by President George W. Bush, and 
to find out the effect, if any, of the EO on noncitizen accessions. The primary 
research question for this study is as follows: Did the enactment of EO 13269 
improve the number of noncitizen accessions to the U.S. military? The secondary 
research questions are the following: What is the value of noncitizens as sources 
of manpower? Do noncitizens take into consideration the value of becoming a 
U.S. citizen when making enlistment decisions?  
B. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
In the second chapter of this thesis, we provide background to better 
understand the main goal of the research. We cover historical information on 
noncitizens, the importance of noncitizens to the military and current legislation 
awarding citizenship to noncitizens through military service. In the third chapter, 
we provide information and a thorough preliminary analysis of the data used in 
the study. In the fourth chapter, we introduce the method and models used for 
the analysis of the data. In the fifth chapter, we present the findings of the 
analysis and discussions on the results. In the last chapter, we provide the 
conclusions of the study and recommendations of the authors. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE HISTORY OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE U.S. 
It would not be erroneous to call the United States “a nation of immigrants” 
(Wong & Cho, 2007). Beginning with the first settlers who traveled through the 
passage between Asia and North America, people have been coming to the 
American continent throughout history. But more specifically, the rise of the 
United States as a new nation is attributed to the Europeans, led by the Spanish 
and French, who established settlements on the continent by the 1500s (United 
States Immigration Before 1965, 1996–2013). Therefore, people who are now 
considered the “true owners” of the country can be traced back to immigrants 
who came to the American continent at some point from different locations of the 
world, which justifies calling the U.S. “a nation of immigrants” (Wong & Cho, 
2007). Later, the descendants of immigrants became the new “natives” of the 
country, regardless of where their ancestors came from, leaving the term 
immigrant to the newcomers who were born in another country and came to 
settle in the United States.  
The history of immigrants in the United States can be divided into four 
periods beginning with the arrival of European explorers and the first European 
settlers who supposedly laid the foundations of the U.S. in the American 
continent (DeSipio & de la Garza, 1998). The first period can be identified as the 
free and open immigration era that covers the time from the first settlements of 
the European immigrants to the 1840s (Smith, 2009). Northern Europeans 
exploring the American continent and African slaves who were forced to 
accompany them were the pioneers. In this era, the main incentives of the 
economically depressed immigrants, attracted by economic opportunities offered 
in the New Lands, were jobs and fertile lands (Smith, 2009). By 1840, the 
population of the states reached about 17 million (“1840 Fast Facts,” 2012). 
Between 1820 and 1840, about 750,000 immigrants came to the U.S. 
(Immigration to the United States, 1789–1930,n.d.).  
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The second period (1840–1880) is known as the industrial immigration  
era (DeSipio & de la Garza, 1998), characterized by “mass immigrations due to 
crop failures in Germany, social turbulence triggered by the rapid industrialization 
of European society, political unrest in Europe, and the Irish Potato Famine 
(1845–1851)” (Immigration to the United States, 1789–1930, n.d.). The estimated 
number of immigrants to the U.S. during this period is four million, according to 
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS; O’Neil & Senturk, 2004). 
The foreign-born population increased from about 2.25 million in 1850 to 
6.7 million in 1880, comprising 13.3% of the U.S. population (Gibson & Jung, 
2011).  
The third period (1880–1920) has been represented as another great 
wave of industrial immigration, during which an estimated 26 million new 
immigrants entered the U.S. (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004). Although the earlier 
immigrants who later became the natives of the country generally accepted these 
new people when the economy was strong, in times of economic hardship, 
people often had different reactions, leading to anti-immigrant feelings (Singer, 
n.d.). At the end of this period, the intense disapproval of immigrants was 
growing. This was reflected in the attitude of earlier settlers of the time, who 
blamed Southern and Eastern Europeans for being “radicals and undesirables 
who could never become truly American” (Singer, n.d.). As a result of this unrest, 
legislation imposing quotas on the number of immigrants was passed in 1921 
and 1924 (Singer, n.d.). Between the years 1920 and 1965, international 
immigration, which was restricted due to the quotas on immigration and public 
disapproval of immigrants, was replaced by internal immigration (Singer, n.d.).  
The fourth period (1965 to the present) can be called the post-industrial 
immigration era, which produced 25 million immigrants (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004). 
In 1965, millions of new immigrants had a chance to enter the U.S. after the 
revision of the immigration laws. During this period, the number of undocumented 
immigrants also increased (DeSipio & de la Garza, 1998). There were an 
estimated 11.5 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. as of January 2011, 
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according to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) annual report (Hoefer, 
Rytina, & Baker, 2012). The 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) revealed 
that the foreign-born population in the U.S. was about 37.5 million, comprising 
13% of the total U.S. population. Approximately 21.5 million of the foreign-born 
population is non-U.S. citizens (“Current Population Survey,” 2012). 
In conclusion, the history of immigrants is presented very briefly here to 
show that the flow of people to the U.S. has continued throughout its history. 
Despite the regulations of Congress and public reaction against immigration, the 
U.S. still continues to attract people from all over the world, and immigration 
remains a significant source of population growth in the U.S.   
B. HISTORY OF NONCITIZENS AND AWARD OF CITIZENSHIP 
THROUGH SERVICE 
The continuous flow of people to the U.S. throughout its history led to 
inevitable interactions between these people and the U.S. military. During the 
wars and conflicts of U.S. history, considerable numbers of people coming to the 
U.S. helped to respond to the manpower needs of the military. 
The service history of the noncitizens and immigrants in the U.S. military 
goes back to the Revolutionary War (Plascencia, 2009). Noncitizens have made 
valuable contributions in the formation of a nation in the Americas. Awarding 
citizenship in return for military service has been a tradition since the 
Revolutionary War (Plascencia, 2009). More than 660,000 military veterans have 
been naturalized through congressional legislation since 1862 (O’Neil & Senturk, 
2004). 
During the Revolutionary War, citizenship was set as an incentive to 
attract both noncitizens and enemy soldiers. Some states’ militias offered state 
citizenship to noncitizens (Wong & Cho, 2007), while the Continental Army 
offered citizenship to enemy soldiers who agreed to switch sides (Franklin, 
1906).  
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By the 1840s, 47% of the Army’s enlistees were immigrants and many of 
them fought in the Mexican–American War (Weigley, 1967). In this period, non-
declarant aliens were eligible for conscription by the Union forces but 
congressional legislation narrowed the eligibility of conscription to only  
declarant aliens in 1863. However, in 1864, the wave turned again and any non-
declarants who had voted or held public office became eligible to enlist (Jacobs & 
Hayes, 1981). 
The rise of anti-immigrant sentiment between 1880 and 1920 resulted in 
congressional legislation that required peacetime enlistees to be able to read, 
write, and speak English. An enlistee had to be a U.S. citizen or to declare “his 
intention to become one” (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004). Yet, non-declarants were 
again accepted to serve in the military during World War I (WWI), which 
demanded giant manpower to satisfy the needs of the war. Nearly 18% of Army 
enlistees were immigrants from 46 different nations (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004). 
The anti-immigrant reaction was provoked again after WWI and non-
declarant alien enlistment was prohibited. About 80,000 military members were 
naturalized between the two world wars (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004). World War II 
increased the need for manpower dramatically, and immigrants including non-
declarant aliens became eligible to enlist (Jacobs & Hayes, 1981). Over 109,000 
noncitizens joined the Army between 1940 and 1945 (Miller & Auerbach, 1948). 
In 1948, declarant aliens were again permitted to serve due to increasing Cold 
War manpower requirements (Jacobs & Hayes, 1981). The Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (INA) of 1952 expanded citizenship eligibility for noncitizens 
including the individuals who served during wartime, regardless of being lawfully 
present in the country or not (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004). The 1968 amendment of 
the INA allowed immigrants who served in the armed forces in the Vietnam War 
to attain citizenship (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004). Executive Order 12081, issued in 
1978, and Executive Order 12939, issued in 1994, allowed the naturalization of 
noncitizens that served during the Vietnam conflict and the Gulf War, respectively 
(Goring, 2011).  
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As explained previously, immigrants have made great contributions to the 
security and welfare of the U.S. by serving in the armed forces since the 
Revolutionary War (Stock, 2009). The need for manpower affected Congress’ 
and society’s attitudes toward immigrants. Many acts of legislation have awarded 
citizenship to noncitizens for their contributions to the U.S., while providing the 
armed forces with an adequate supply of manpower, creating a win–win scenario 
for both parties. 
C. WHY NONCITIZENS ARE IMPORTANT 
Noncitizens provide an important and valuable pool of applicants for 
recruiters for several reasons. The characteristics of noncitizens and the role of 
the U.S. and its military power as a political tool around the world increases the 
need for noncitizens (McIntosh, Sayala, & Gregory, 2011). 
1. Noncitizen Population 
In 2011, McIntosh, Sayala, and Gregory analyzed the noncitizen 
population in the U.S. using data from the ACS and the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) in a report prepared for the Center for Naval Analyses. They found 
that there were 7 million noncitizens in the age range of 18 to 29 years. By 
applying the requirements for noncitizens to enlist in the military—being legal 
permanent residents, being high school graduates, and being able to speak 
English well—to the data, they found that there were an estimated 1.2 million 
noncitizens who have the necessary qualifications for enlistment. When 
compared to an overall population of 42 million who are eligible to enlist, this 
number might seem relatively small; however, it is still large enough to support 
the achievement of the end strength goals of the Services with a more focused 
recruiting strategy. Additionally, the importance of noncitizens as a source of 
recruits will keep increasing because immigrants are projected to be the major 
source of future population growth amongst young people between the ages of 
18 and 24.  
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2. Individual Characteristics 
In this section, we present the benefits of incorporating noncitizens to 
military through the findings of several studies focused on the performance of 
enlistees. O’Neil and Senturk (2004) found that noncitizens have an average 
first-term attrition rate that is 9 percentage points lower than the average rate for 
citizens, and the average rate of retention beyond the first term is 10 percentage 
points higher for noncitizens than for citizens. The average rate of promotion to 
E-4 is nearly 2 percentage points higher for noncitizens. Also, attrition rates are 
significantly lower in all Services ranging from 16 percentage points (Navy) to 
10 percentage points (Air Force) lower than citizens. Also, noncitizens have 
estimated retention rates ranging from 10 percentage points higher (Navy) to 
6 percentage points higher (Marine Corps) than do citizens. Moreover, 
noncitizens have a significantly higher estimated probability of promotion to E-4 
in all four Services. Their predicted promotion rates ranged from 6.5 percentage 
points higher (Marine Corps) to 2.4 percentage points higher (Air Force) than 
citizens. 
 Hattiangadi, Quester, Lee, Lien, & MacLeod (2005) found that noncitizens 
had three-month attrition rates, which were lower than those of citizens. They 
analyzed the accession data covering fiscal year (FY) 1988 and FY2003 by 
separating the data into two periods, one from FY1988 to FY1994 and the other 
from FY1995 to FY2003, to be able to see the behavioral changes. They found 
that three-month attrition rates of noncitizens are 1.8 percentage points lower in 
the earlier period, and 3.7 percentage points lower in the more recent period.  
These statistically significant results showed that Black, American-Pacific 
Islander (API), and Hispanic noncitizens were predicted to have three-month 
attrition rates that were 7 to 8 percentage points below those for White citizens. 
All else equal, White and other noncitizens were predicted to have three-month 
attrition rates of 3.3 and 5.8 percentage points below those of White citizens.  
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Hattiangadi et al. (2005) reported that 36-month attrition rates for citizens 
and noncitizens were 32.2% and 18.7%, respectively. Other things equal, 
noncitizens had 36-month attrition rates that were 9 to 20 percentage points 
lower than White citizens. Again, most noncitizens are Hispanic or API; these 
noncitizen recruits have 36-month attrition rates 16.5 and 20 percentage points, 
respectively, below White citizens.  
McIntosh et al. (2011) also found results compatible with the findings of 
the studies mentioned previously. They found that the attrition rates of the 
noncitizen enlistees were less than their counterparts (3 months, 36 months, and 
48 months after accession) in the military, even after controlling for demographic 
and service-related characteristics that likely affect attrition.  
In addition to the benefits brought by relatively better adaptation of 
noncitizens to military life, as demonstrated by the findings of the studies cited 
earlier in the section, the military also benefits from the diversity that noncitizens 
bring with them. First, language and cultural skills inherited by the noncitizens are 
of strategic interest to the U.S. military considering the locations in which U.S. 
troops are deployed all over the world (McIntosh, Sayala, & Gregory, 2011). As 
Stock (2009) explained, “Without the contributions of immigrants, the military 
could not meet its recruiting goals and could not fill its need for foreign‐language 
translators, interpreters, and cultural experts.” Secondly, the presence of 
noncitizens contributes to the cultural knowledge base of the military and 
improves the understanding of its members encountering various situations while 
serving around the world (Malfatti-Rachell, 2008) 
3. Economic and Political Factors 
As the economy improves and the unemployment rate decreases, 
recruiters face shortages in finding qualified manpower (Warner, 2012). The 
valuable noncitizen pool may help recruiters meet their goals.	 Although the  
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recruitable noncitizens pool might be small compared to the overall recruitable 
population, noncitizens are still a key recruiting resource (McIntosh, Sayala, & 
Gregory, 2011). 
The United States military is the primary instrument of American foreign 
policy as the nation enters the 21st century (Cyrulik, 2004). As explained by 
Adams (2007) “The U.S. approach to the future of global security is almost 
entirely military in nature. The United States is moving toward reliance on its 
military instrument for the future of its security.” The end of the Cold War affected 
the number of deployments and the operational tempo of the armed forces. 
Keeping the armed forces ready at the desired level has required more 
manpower. 9/11 and the initial campaigns of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) 
have further increased the demand. The Services’ vast scope of missions—
homeland security, deterrence missions around the world, and the operations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans—have started a debate about the appropriate 
size of the force. Many people have made efforts to increase the number of units 
and the end strength of the Services (Cyrulik, 2004). Although the technological 
shift may seem to reduce the need for manpower, manpower will always remain 
as a central issue.  
Considering the manpower demand of the military with regards to its role, 
as explained previously, John M. Cyrulik (2004) advised that the United States 
Armed Forces should actively recruit skilled noncitizens overseas through the 
promise of American citizenship as a reward for their service in his monograph. 
Considering the current roles assumed by the U.S. military in the international 
arena, together with the ongoing conflicts within nations and between nations 
and continuing terrorist activities all over the world, the need for the expansion of 
the armed forces, or at least maintaining the current level of manning, is 
projected to remain one of the challenges for the military in the foreseeable future 
(Cyrulik, 2004). 
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4. Social Aspects 
Because some noncitizens are undocumented and living without being 
legally present in the U.S., one way to adapt noncitizens to society is to allow 
them to serve in the military, which would provide lawful employment and training 
opportunities. This can provide significant benefits for society and for the 
noncitizens (Goring, 2011).  
D. INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS 
1. Process for Attaining U.S. Citizenship 
The most common paths to U.S. citizenship for foreign nationals are 
through family sponsorship and military service (“Path to U.S. Citizenship,” 
2013). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) oversees the application 
process. In 2011, the DHS granted U.S. citizenship to a total of 694,193 foreign 
nationals (Lee, 2012). A typical foreign national applying for U.S. citizenship must 
meet several DHS requirements. The requirements include being 18 years of age 
or older; holding a green card for at least five years; being able to read, write, 
and speak the English language; being able to demonstrate a basic knowledge of 
U.S. government and history; having continuous residence in the United States, 
from the date of application until the time of naturalization; and being a person of 
good moral character (Lee, 2012; “Path to U.S. Citizenship,” 2013). 
Foreign nationals often encounter delays in their quests for U.S. 
citizenship, which is mainly due to the limited number of green cards that the 
DHS issues per year.1 U.S. law, for example, caps the number of family-
sponsored green cards at 480,000 per year (Giller [last name withheld], personal 
                                            
1 Foreign nationals may obtain green cards through a number of channels, such as family 
sponsorship, employment and humanitarian means, including being a victim of human trafficking, 
a refugee, an informant, and so forth (“Other Ways to Get a Green Card,” 2013). The processing 
time varies greatly depending on the type of applicant. In general, family-sponsored green cards 
take about 11 years to process, whereas employer-sponsored green cards take roughly two 
years (Giller [last name withheld], personal communication, June 17, 2011; Mary [last name 
withheld], personal communication, June 13, 2011; Visa Bulletin for June 2011, 2011). According 
to 2010 DHS figures, after receiving their green cards, foreign nationals applying for U.S. 
citizenship spend a median of six years waiting for the completion of the citizenship application 
process (Lee, 2012). 
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communication, June 17, 2011; Monger & Yankay, 2012; “The Number of Green 
Cards,” 1999; Immigration and Nationality Act [INA], 1996, subch. II) Similarly, 
U.S. law permits a maximum number of 140,000 employment-sponsored green 
cards, plus any unused family-sponsored applicants from the previous year 
(Giller [last name withheld], personal communication, June 17, 2011; INA, 1996, 
subch. II; “The Number of Green Cards,” 1999). In 2010, the law capped 
employment-sponsored green cards at 150,657 (Monger & Yankay, 2012). 
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (spouses and children, including orphans 
adopted abroad of U.S. citizens and parents of adult U.S. citizens aged 21 and 
over) are not subject to the family-sponsored cap of 480,000 (Giller [last name 
withheld], personal communication, June 17, 2011; Monger & Yankay, 2012). 
According to DHS figures, sponsorship by immediate relatives accounted for 
46% of the 1,042,625 green cards issued in FY2010 (Monger & Yankay, 2012). 
In the vast majority of cases, the DHS may not issue green cards for U.S. military 
(Sheila [last name withheld], personal communication, June 15, 2011). 
Permanent residents must first obtain a green card through employment, family, 
or humanitarian means before applying for U.S. military service (Sheila [last 
name withheld], personal communication, June 15, 2011).2 
Due to the large backlog of green card applications and the limited 
number of slots available, the United States has implemented a lottery system for 
foreign nationals to attain green cards. The DHS received a total of 19,672,268 
applications for the 2012 green card lottery (“Total Number of DV Lottery 
Applicants,” 2012). The 2012 lottery was scheduled to grant 55,000 green cards 
(or 0.28%) of the roughly 20 million applicants who were eligible for green cards 
(“Diversity Visa [DV] Program,” 1995). 
Following the receipt of their green cards, foreign nationals applying for 
citizenship generally have the same requirements as all applicants, except for a 
                                            
2 In 2009, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) implemented a limited pilot program involving 
1,000 recruits, which allowed non-green card holders to join the U.S. military in order to cover 
shortages in mission critical areas, such as medical care and language interpretation (Gilmore, 
2008; Preston, 2009; “U.S. Army ‘wants more immigrants,'” 2009).  
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few caveats. The major difference across applicants is the duration of the DHS-
regulated waiting period. Generally speaking, employment-sponsored permanent 
residents must wait the full mandated five years, whereas individuals who are 
married to U.S. citizens only have to wait three years to be eligible for U.S. 
citizenship application (Giller [last name withheld], personal communication, June 
17, 2011; Lee, 2012; Mary [last name withheld], personal communication, June 
13, 2011). Other family member–sponsored applicants (such as sibling-
sponsored applicants) usually have to wait five years (Anthony [last name 
withheld], personal communication, June 14, 2011) 
The entire timeline for obtaining U.S. citizenship, which includes the time 
to receive an initial green card, the five-year waiting period, and the final 
citizenship application process, can in many instances take decades to complete. 
The length of time to receive citizenship depends largely on the type of applicant 
and the eligibility requirements in place. Generally speaking, a family-sponsored 
applicant will wait about 17 years to become a U.S. citizen, whereas the process 
for an employer-sponsored applicant takes roughly eight years (Giller [last name 
withheld], personal communication, June 17, 2011; Mary [last name withheld], 
personal communication, June 13, 2011; Visa Bulletin for June 2011, 2011). The 
time it takes to receive U.S. citizenship for permanent residents serving in the 
military is similar to that of their civilian counterparts; the DHS, however, does not 
require those serving in the U.S. military to wait the mandatory five years as 
described in Executive Order 13269 (2002; Mary [last name withheld], personal 
communication, June 13, 2011). 
2. Current Legislation for Service Members 
There are currently two sections of the INA (1996) that characterize the 
expedited citizenship attainment through military service. Section 328 of the INA 
characterizes naturalization through peacetime service, and Section 329 and 
329A explain naturalization by serving during wartime and posthumous 
naturalization (Lee & Wasem , 2009).  
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a. Service in Peacetime 
Section 328 of the INA applies to all members of the U.S. Armed 
Forces and those already discharged from service (INA, 1996, § 1439). USCIS 
states the requirements3 for an individual to qualify for naturalization as follows: 
 Be age 18 or older, 
 Have served honorably in the U.S. armed forces for at least 
1 year and, if separated from the U.S. Armed Forces, have 
been separated honorably , 
 Be a permanent resident at the time of examination on the 
naturalization application, 
 Be able to read, write, and speak basic English, 
 Have a knowledge of U.S. history and government (civics), 
 Have been a person of good moral character during all 
relevant periods under the law, 
 Have an attachment to the principles of the U.S. Constitution 
and be well disposed to the good order and happiness of the 
U.S. during all relevant periods under the law, 
 Have continuously resided in the United States for at least 
five years and have been physically present in the United 
States for at least 30 months out of the 5 years immediately 
preceding the date of filing the application, UNLESS the 
applicant has filed an application while still in the service or 
within 6 months of separation. In the latter case, the 
applicant is not required to meet these residence and 
physical presence requirements. (“Citizenship for Military 
Members,” 2010) 
In the last decade, after the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
there has been more interest in legislation that extends expedited citizenship 
benefits (Lee & Wasem , 2009). The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; 
2003) for FY2004, the Army’s Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest 
(MAVNI) program and discussions on the enactment of the Development, Relief, 
and Education Act for Alien Minors (DREAM Act) can be counted among this 
interest.  
                                            
3 The eligibility requirements for naturalization are imported directly from the USCIS website. 
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The NDAA for FY2004 modified the naturalization process for 
permanent residents serving in the armed forces of the United States. The NDAA 
amended the INA to allow U.S. military personnel the ability to apply for 
citizenship after one year of honorable service during peacetime, instead of the 
prior three-year requirement (Chu, 2006; Hattiangadi, et al., 2005; INA, 1996, 
subch. III). It also eliminated all application fees for military members when 
applying for citizenship, effective October 1, 2004 (Chu, 2006; Hattiangadi et al., 
2005). The Army’s MAVNI program, introduced in 2008, allowed noncitizens who 
were eligible to enlist—with the exception of the legal permanent resident status 
requirement—to benefit from expedited citizenship (McIntosh, Sayala, & Gregory, 
2011). The DREAM Act, if it comes into effect as opposed to its name, will make 
undocumented aliens eligible to enlist by legalizing their presence in the U.S. and 
allowing them to take advantage of expedited citizenship benefits offered to 
service members (Stock, 2006). 
b. Service During Periods of Hostilities 
Section 329 of the INA (1996) provides the noncitizen service 
members with immediate eligibility for naturalization during designated periods of 
hostilities. The USCIS states the requirements for the applicants under INA 329, 
as follows. The applicant must: 
 Have served honorably in active-duty status, or as a member 
of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve, for any 
amount of time during a designated period of hostilities and, 
if separated from the U.S. armed forces, have been 
separated honorably  
 Have been lawfully admitted as a permanent resident at any 
time after enlistment or induction, OR have been physically 
present in the United States or certain territories at the time 
of enlistment or induction (regardless of whether the 
applicant was admitted as a permanent resident) 
 Be able to read, write, and speak basic English 
 Have a knowledge of U.S. history and government (civics) 
 Have been a person of good moral character during all 
relevant periods under the law 
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 Have an attachment to the principles of the U.S. Constitution 
and be well disposed to the good order and happiness of the 
U.S. during all relevant periods under the law. (“Citizenship 
for Military Members,” 2010) 
Section 329 of the INA allows service members to qualify for 
naturalization without requiring them to be permanent residents, reside 
continuously for five years, and be physically present in the U.S. (A Guide to 
Naturalization, 2012).  
Until 1968, the designated periods of hostilities were specified in 
section 329 of the INA (1996). Therefore, a revision was required for every new 
conflict. However, an amendment to the act in 1968 provided the president with 
the authority to designate periods of hostilities by an executive order allowing the 
aliens in the military to apply for citizenship under the provisions of INA 329 (Lee 
& Wasem, 2009). Veterans who served in the military during WWI or during a 
period beginning September 1, 1939, and ending December 31, 1946, or during 
a period beginning June 25, 1950, and ending July 1, 1955, or during a period 
beginning February 28, 1961, are also covered by this section (INA, 1996, § 
1440).  
c. Executive Order 13269—Expedited Naturalization of 
Aliens and Noncitizen Nationals Serving in an Active-
Duty Status during the War on Terrorism 
President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13269 on July 
3, 2002, as follows: 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the 
laws of the United States of America, including section 329 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1440) (the “Act”), and solely in 
order to provide expedited naturalization for aliens and noncitizen 
nationals serving in an active-duty status in the Armed Forces of the 
United States during the period of the war against terrorists of global 
reach, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
 
For the purpose of determining qualification for the exception from the 
usual requirements for naturalization, I designate as a period in which the 
Armed Forces of the United States were engaged in armed conflict with a 
hostile foreign force the period beginning on September 11, 2001. Such 
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period will be deemed to terminate on a date designated by a future 
executive order. Those persons serving honorably in active-duty status in 
the Armed Forces of the United States, during the period beginning on 
September 11, 2001, and terminating on the date to be so designated, are 
eligible for naturalization in accordance with the statutory exception to the 
naturalization requirements, as provided in section 329 of the Act. Nothing 
contained in this order is intended to affect, nor does it affect, any other 
power, right, or obligation of the United States, its agencies, officers, 
employees, or any other person under Federal law or the law of nations. 
Prior to Executive Order 13269, permanent residents who had 
served honorably at any time in the armed forces of the United States for at least 
three years were eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship (Hattiangadi, et al., 2005; 
INA, 1996, subch. III). The U.S. president will determine the termination of the 
executive order at a later date; as of February 2013, it was still in effect. 
Military service members must still meet the other DHS 
requirements for citizenship, such as the ability to read, write, and speak the 
English language and have a basic knowledge of U.S. government and history. 
Additionally, the executive order did not change the naturalization process for 
military personnel’s family members; the DHS still requires military family 
members to go through the same process that was in place before the law 
change. 
d. Posthumous Benefits 
According to Public Law 101–249, amended to the INA, 
posthumous citizenship is granted to a noncitizen if the person dies from a 
disease or an injury while serving honorably in active duty in the armed forces of 
the U.S. in the period of hostilities defined in section 329 of the INA (INA, 1996, 
§ 1440). The deceased service member is considered a citizen at the date of 
his/her death. If citizenship is not granted at the date of death, then the next-of-
kin may request the posthumous citizenship (“Posthumuous Citizenship,” 2011). 
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3. Number of Naturalized Service Members 
Since September 2001, USCIS has naturalized 74,977 members of the 
military, with 9,773 of those service members becoming citizens during USCIS 
naturalization ceremonies in 27 different countries. USCIS has naturalized 1,236 
military spouses since 2008. USCIS has presented 64 children of members of 
the military with citizenship certificates since 2009 (Naturalization Through 
Military Service, 2011). Figure 1 shows total number of naturalized service 
members by year. 
 
Figure 1.  Total Number of Naturalized Service Members  
(After Naturalization Through Military Service, 2011)  
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III. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
A. DATA SOURCE 
The dataset used in this study is based on archival data provided by the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The DMDC data includes information 
on enlisted military accessions for all five Services during the period between 
FY2000 and FY2010. For FY2010, the latest information available is in June 
2010, three months before the end of the fiscal year. The dataset consists of 
information about the individual’s Service, sex, race, accession state, pay grade, 
accession date, prior service indicator, citizenship status, age, and educational 
level at the time of accession.  
Dale and Gilroy (1984) found that the unemployment rate at the time of 
accession has an effect on the enlistment decisions of the recruits. Since we 
wanted to add this variable to our analysis and as it was not available in the 
original DMDC dataset, we extracted this data from the CPS website and 
appended to the aggregate version of the DMDC data. 
The archival dataset is in individual level and contains a total of 1,984,644 
records for the five Services. We are interested in the number of monthly 
accessions during the given period. Both citizen and noncitizen accessions are 
seasonal in behavior. The seasonality depends on recruiting efforts that differ 
depending on the time of year and factors that affect the enlistee’s enlistment 
decision, such as school graduation, personal choices, and economic reasons. In 
order to create a dataset that displays the monthly accessions for the purpose of 
this analysis, we converted the data from individual-level data to monthly 
aggregate data Our model is based on comparing two groups—citizen enlistees 
and noncitizen enlistees—by using difference-in-difference estimation. Citizen 
accessions are the control group, and noncitizen accessions are the treatment 
group. We assumed that the enlistment decisions of both groups were affected 
by the same factors. The difference-in-difference estimation helps us understand 
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whether the noncitizen accessions increased after the executive order. By 
comparing the two groups before and after EO 13269 came into effect, we study 
whether EO 13269 has had any effect on the number of noncitizen accessions.  
B. DATA RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The data from the DMDC is at the individual level. It was not possible to 
make an analysis to find out the effect of the EO by using this data because 
accessions as the dependent variable are positive for each individual in the 
dataset representing a constant. Therefore, we aggregated the data to monthly 
accessions and used two observations for each month, reflecting the number of 
citizen and noncitizen accessions separately. Finally, we could use this data in a 
difference-in-difference estimation to find out the true effect of the executive 
order comparing citizen accessions with noncitizens. 
The DMDC stated that citizenship data was not available prior to FY2000. 
Therefore, the data relevant to this study begins from this date, and previous 
data is not included in the study. There are 66 observations for the period before, 
and 192 observations for the period after the effective date of the EO. 
The latest information in the data is from June 2010. Therefore, we do not 
have the information for the entire FY2010. We excluded FY2010 data while 
making inferences from yearly analyses.  
The citizenship status in the data is described in four categories. These 
categories are non-U.S. citizen or national, U.S. citizen, U.S. national, and 
unknown. Since U.S. nationals are not accepted as U.S. citizens according to 8 
U.S.C. § 1408 (INA, 1996, § 1408), and as they will be eligible for expedited 
citizenship, we included them in the noncitizen category. Finally, we dropped 908 
unknown observations regarding citizenship status. Also, there are five 
observations in the gender variable recorded as unknown, so we dropped the 
missing values.  
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The dataset also includes a variable named Prior Service Indicator. Out of 
1,983,707 individuals included in the dataset, 126,871 had served in one of the 
armed services in the past and, after a break, reaccessed during the period in 
which the dataset was constructed. We considered dropping the individuals with 
prior service because their enlistment decision would rely on reasons other than 
the non-prior service individuals’. The main reason would be their experience and 
familiarity with military service. This fact could diminish the effect of the EO on 
their enlistment decisions. On the other hand, we thought that the effect of the 
executive order might have been greater on them, because they knew the 
military service better; with the benefits of the executive order, service could just 
become more attractive. Finally, finding out that the noncitizens with prior service 
consist of only 3.5% of all noncitizen accessions, and taking into account 
problems with clearly identifying the direction of the pure effect of having prior 
service, we decided to keep them in the dataset. 
The main goal of the study is to compare the pre- and post-EO periods 
regarding the citizenship status of accessions. We used July 2002, the date the 
EO was signed, as the threshold for the EO period. Accessions from October 
1999 to June 2002 comprised the pre-EO period, and provided a sample size of 
532,856 and 66 observations. Accessions from August 2002 to June 2010 
formed the post-EO period and provided a sample size of 1,450,851 and 192 
observations.  
C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In our dataset, the number of total accessions from FY2000 to FY2010 is 
1,983,707. Across the whole sample, there are 75,176 noncitizen accessions to 
all Services of the military in this period, comprising 3.8% of all accessions. As 
shown in Figure 2, the Army has the largest proportion of all accessions with 
41%, followed by the Navy with 22%. The Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast 
Guard comprise 18%, 17%, and 2% of all accessions, respectively.  
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Figure 2.  Service Share in Total Accessions 
When it comes to the share of Services in noncitizen accessions, the 
Service shares ranking remains the same, while the magnitudes change slightly. 
As can be seen in Figure 3, The Army comprises 41% of all noncitizen 
accessions just as the same proportion in all accessions. Like the Army, the 
Marine Corps maintains an 18% share for both kinds of accessions. The Navy’s 
share increases to 30% in noncitizen accessions from 22% in all accessions. On 
the other hand, the share of the Air Force and Coast Guard in noncitizen 
accessions is smaller than their share in all accessions. The Air Force’s share 
declines from 17% in all accessions to 10% in noncitizen accessions. Similarly, 
the Coast Guard declines from 2% to 1%. 
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Figure 3.  Service Share in Total Noncitizen Accessions 
When we look at the shares of citizen and noncitizen accessions within 
the Services as can be seen in Table 1, the Navy has the largest proportion of 
noncitizen accessions, followed by the Marines, Army, Air Force, and Coast 
Guard, respectively.  
Table 1.   Share of Citizen and Noncitizen Accessions within the Service 
 
 
Table 2 presents the shares of different ethnicities and genders in all 
citizen accessions and noncitizen accessions, arranged by Services. For citizens, 
White comprises the largest group in total and in Service accessions. Except for 
the Marines and Coast Guard, Black representation is more than Hispanics. 
Asian Pacific Islanders make up about 2–3% of the accessions, while other 
ethnicities are around 1–2%. 
 
All Services Army Air Force Navy Marine Coast Guard
citizen 96.2% 96.2% 97.8% 95.0% 96.0% 98.3%
non‐citizen 3.8% 3.8% 2.2% 5.0% 4.0% 1.7%
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For noncitizens, Hispanics are the largest group represented in total 
accessions, followed by Asian Pacific Islanders. Blacks and Whites make up 
about 20% and 13%, respectively. For the Service accessions, except for the 
Army and Coast Guard, the rank does not change. The Army’s and Coast 
Guard’s Black accessions exceed the Asian Pacific Islander accessions. 
American Indian representation is the lowest in all and in Service accessions. 
Table 2.   Percentage of Demographic Variables in Total, Citizen and  
Noncitizen Accessions, by Service 
 
 
When we compare the educational attainment of the two groups of 
accessions, the most prominent difference is among baccalaureate degree and 
alternative high school graduate accessions. The percentage of baccalaureate 
degree accessions among noncitizens is almost twice the percentage compared 
to the citizen group. In contrast, alternative high school graduates are twice as 
high in percentage among citizens as than for noncitizens. The other ratios of 
educational attainment are similar in the two groups. Figure 4 shows the 
percentages of education levels within each group. 
 
 
total ctzn
non
ctzn total ctzn
non
ctzn total ctzn
non
ctzn total ctzn
non
ctzn total ctzn
non
ctzn total ctzn
non
ctzn
White 63.9 65.9 13.0 63.3 65.2 15.3 69.1 70.3 15.7 55.9 58.4 8.2 69.2 71.5 13.5 74.6 75.4 22.7
Black 15.1 14.9 20.4 16.1 15.9 21.7 15.6 15.5 17.2 18.2 17.9 23.2 9.3 9.1 14.7 6.3 6.2 16.8
Hispanic 12.7 11.7 37.5 11.6 10.6 35.7 9.6 9.1 30.4 14.8 13.8 33.5 15.8 14.3 51.7 12.4 11.9 40.8
Am.Indian 1.7 1.8 0.4 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.3 4.5 4.7 0.4 1.1 1.1 0.5 2.0 2.0 0.3
As.Pac.Islander 3.3 2.5 22.9 2.9 2.2 20.4 3.6 3.0 30.0 4.4 3.1 29.5 2.7 2.2 14.1 2.4 2.2 14.7
Other 1.1 1.0 3.6 0.7 0.7 2.8 1.2 1.1 5.3 1.8 1.7 4.3 0.9 0.8 3.6 1.8 1.8 3.9
Unknown 2.1 2.1 2.3 4.3 4.4 3.7 0.4 0.4 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.9 2.0 0.5 0.5 0.9
Male 83.4 83.5 80.9 82.8 83.0 78.3 77.1 77.2 72.5 81.8 81.9 80.9 92.8 92.8 91.5 84.7 84.7 84.5
Female 16.6 16.5 19.1 17.2 17.0 21.7 22.9 22.8 27.5 18.2 18.1 19.1 7.2 7.2 8.5 15.3 15.3 15.5
Coast GuardMarineNavyAir ForceArmyAll Services
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Figure 4.  Educational Attainment of Accessions in Percentage,  
by Citizenship Status 
It is remarkable that the number of average monthly noncitizen accessions 
for all of the variables included in the table, except for the Coast Guard and 
American Indians, falls during the time period after the implementation of the 
executive order. By looking at this, we can easily say that the executive order 
had either no effect or a negative effect on noncitizen accessions. When we 
check the average monthly citizen accessions for the pre- and post-EO periods, 
we also observe a decrease for all of the variables, except for the Army, Marines, 
Hispanics, and American Indians, casting questions on our first inference.   
When we dig a little deeper, it is interesting to find an increase in average 
monthly Army and Marine citizen accessions and a decrease in noncitizen 
accessions. The reason for this could be the end strength goals of these 
Services. While all the Services set an overall end strength goal, they do not 
have a specific recruitment goal for noncitizens. The Army and Marines, as the 
“fighter” Services with relatively higher casualties, may have less appeal for 
noncitizens than their citizen counterparts, as noncitizens may choose to abstain 
from making too great of a sacrifice for a country in which they are not yet 
citizens. Additionally, an increasing monthly unemployment rate, from 4.6% in the 
pre-EO period to 6.1% in the post-EO period, might help explain the increase in 
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the Army and Marine accessions because these Services can be less desirable 
than the other Services when there is a low rate of unemployment. Table 3 
shows the results of these comparisons. 
Table 3.   Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Total Citizen
Non
Citizen Citizen
Non
Citizen Citizen
Non
Citizen
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
15377.6 14794.8 582.8 15459.2 688.0 14566.4 546.6
(4264.9) (4105.8) (187.0) (4773.2) (222.2) (3851.4) (159.1)
6334.7 6094.0 240.7 5950.0 255.7 6143.5 235.5
(2338.8) (2253.6) (101.1) (2530.7) (115.6) (2162.5) (95.7)
2646.1 2586.8 59.3 2885.4 78.5 2484.2 52.6
(639.6) (622.0) (22.2) (599.7) (20.2) (598.7) (18.7)
3400.7 3229.6 171.1 3904.3 220.9 2997.6 154.0
(1126.5) (1066.0) (67.9) (1229.3) (80.9) (899.7) (53.3)
2674.2 2568.0 106.3 2370.3 128.9 2635.9 98.5
(1009.9) (976.8) (42.3) (869.3) (46.1) (1006.3) (38.1)
321.9 316.5 5.4 349.2 4.0 305.3 5.9
(101.7) (100.7) (3.1) (125.8) (1.7) (88.5) (3.3)
9830.3 9754.7 75.6 10343.8 83.4 9552.3 72.9
(2746.0) (2725.5) (24.3) (3105.7) (28.2) (2568.7) (22.4)
2320.9 2202.2 118.7 2824.9 156.7 1988.1 105.6
(839.2) (802.0) (42.1) (1058.0) (47.9) (555.5) (30.8)
1953.8 1735.3 218.6 1511.8 252.9 1812.1 206.7
(582.5) (530.2) (81.8) (496.8) (99.4) (521.9) (71.7)
510.4 377.1 133.3 376.1 159.4 377.4 124.3
(171.8) (129.4) (48.7) (104.6) (46.7) (137.4) (46.3)
266.8 264.7 2.2 259.9 2.0 266.3 2.2
(77.7) (77.1) (1.9) (70.8) (1.8) (79.4) (2.0)
172.2 151.1 21.2 139.6 33.4 155.0 17.0
(88.1) (67.6) (26.7) (41.0) (10.3) (74.3) (29.2)
323.1 309.8 13.4 3.1 0.3 415.2 17.9
(281.5) (274.2) (12.2) (2.7) (0.6) (239.5) (11.0)
12822.5 12350.8 471.7 12711.1 554.1 12227.0 443.3
(3559.6) (3430.7) (154.0) (3933.2) (184.1) (3253.7) (131.8)
2555.1 2444.0 111.1 2748.1 133.8 2339.4 103.3
(740.1) (708.9) (36.5) (859.3) (41.7) (620.6) (31.0)
5.7 5.7 5.7 4.6 4.6 6.1 6.1
(1.7) (1.7) (1.7) (0.7) (0.7) (1.7) (1.7)
510,153       22,703          1,398,378    52,473         
Pre‐EO 13269 Post‐EO 13269
Total Accessions
Army Accessions
Air Force Accessions
Variables
Complete Time Period
Male Accessions
Female Accessions
Navy Accessions
Marine Corps
Accessions
Coast Guard
Accessions
White Accessions
Black Accessions
Hispanic Accessions
Asian Pacific Islander
Accessions
American Indian
Accessions
Other Race Accessions
Accessions with
Unknown Race Status
Total  Pre‐EO = 532,856 Total  Post‐EO = 1,450,851
Unemployment Rate
Sample Size 1,983,707    1,908,531    75,176         
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Figure 5 shows the monthly citizen and noncitizen accessions during the 
period. Compatible with the descriptive statistics, there is a noticeable declining 
trend in the noncitizen accessions, whereas citizen accessions show no sign of 
increase or decrease. The accessions display seasonality due to the nature of 
accessions. As one can see, the accessions are at their highest level in the 
summer season because of new graduates from high schools.  
 
Figure 5.  Monthly Citizen and Noncitizen Accessions, FY2000–FY2010 
As can be seen in Figure 6, the number of total accessions declined from 
around 8,500 in FY2000 to about 5,500 in FY2009. If we examine the changes in 
the number of noncitizens by Service, the Navy displays the largest declining 
trend, declining 51% in FY2009 compared to FY2000. The Army, which has the 
largest number of noncitizen accessions among all the Services, shows a sharp 
decline in FY2005 but later shows an upward trend. Although noncitizen  
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accessions to the Coast Guard are very small relative to the other Services, the 
trend is upward until FY2006 and then starts to decline; finally, in FY2009, it turns 
back to the FY2000 level with a slight 7% increase.  
 
Figure 6.  Number of Noncitizen Accessions, by Service and  
Accession Fiscal Year 
Overall, noncitizen accessions comprise 3.8% of total accessions. When 
we compare noncitizen accessions to all accessions by Service, we find that the 
Navy has the largest proportion with 5%. The Army and Marines maintain a 
similar proportion within all accessions with 3.8% and 4%, respectively. On the 
other hand, the Air Force and Coast Guard account for 2.2% and 1.7%, 
respectively. As seen in Figure 7, the share of noncitizens has a declining trend 
for the whole period except for the Coast Guard, which shows an increasing 
trend. 
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Figure 7.  Noncitizen Accessions as a Percentage of Total Accessions,  
by Service and Accession Fiscal Year 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression using difference-in-
difference (DD) estimation is used in this analysis. In order to find the effect of a 
policy on a particular group after its imposition, we need a control group that has 
similar characteristics to the treatment group but on whom the policy is not 
imposed particularly. Both the treatment and the control groups should be 
followed for the same period of time, before and after the policy is imposed. 
The general expression of such a model (Woolridge, 2009) is as follows: 
 yct XcTt Xc Tt ct (1)
where 
yct is the outcome for group c in period t, 
c to denote the group indicator,  
t to denote the time period, 
Xc is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the group is the treatment 
group and 0 if the group is the control group,  
 Tt is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 in the post-treatment period 
and 0 in the pre-treatment period, 
ctisthe error term. 
The DD estimator is going to be the OLS estimate of 3, the coefficient of 
the interaction between Xc and Tt, which is identified as the treatment group in the 
after-policy period. This is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 only for the 
treatment group in the post-treatment period. 
We assume that the economic and social conditions and other 
unobservables are the same for both control and treatment groups during the 
period. The opportunities that the military offers such as a respected job, 
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education support, training that is also applicable to civilian life, insurance, and 
retirement benefits attract both citizens and noncitizens.  
The accession model helps us understand the effect of Executive Order 
13269 on the noncitizen accessions to the armed forces. Citizen accessions for 
the whole period are set up as the control group and noncitizen accessions are 
set up as treatment group. As explained in the theoretical model (1), we created 
a dummy variable to define the pre- and post-EO period. July 2002, the date the 
EO took effect, is the threshold for the model. We aggregated both citizen and 
noncitizen accessions. We also created a dummy variable that defines 
citizenship. An interaction term between citizenship and post period is created to 
capture the post-treatment effect. 
Equation (2) is the basic model to explain the effect of EO on the 
noncitizen accessions: 
log(accession)tc= noncit)c post_EO)t  (post_EO *noncit) 
tc+Xt +t+tc (2) 
where 
log of accession = log of the monthly accessions to the all Services of the 
armed forces, 
noncit= is a dummy variable, 1 if the accessions are noncitizens and 0 
otherwise, 
post_EO= is a dummy variable, 1 if the accession date is later than June 
2002, 0 otherwise, 
post_EO*noncit= is the interaction term between post and noncit 
variables, which is the effect of EO on noncitizens, 
indicates month fixed effect, 
X denotes national monthly unemployment rates, 
is the error term. 
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The dependent variable is the log of the total number of accessions for the 
specific month of the year. We used a semi-logarithmic regression with a 
transformed dependent variable to eliminate the problems resulting from 
homoscedasticity and normality. The dataset covers 129 months between 
October 1999 (the beginning of FY2000) and June 2010 (FY2010). For each 
month, we calculated the number of citizen and noncitizen accessions 
separately. Therefore, there are two observations for each month, which doubles 
the number of observations to 258. 
Citizenship status is defined in the dataset for each individual and 
classified into four categories. These categories are non-U.S. citizen or national, 
U.S. citizen, U.S. national, and unknown. We deleted individuals with the 
unknown citizenship status. Since U.S. nationals are not accepted as U.S. 
citizens, we included them in the non-U.S. citizen or national category. We 
created two different variables for citizenship. The base case and the control 
group in the model is citizen. The citizen and noncitizen variables are binary. The 
citizen variable is defined as 1 if the accessions are citizens and 0 otherwise. The 
noncitizen variable is defined as 1 if the accessions are noncitizens and 
0 otherwise. 
Pre- and post-EO variables are binary. Pre_EO is defined as 1 if the 
accession date is before July 2002, 0 otherwise. Post_EO is defined as 1 if the 
accession date is in or after July 2002, 0 otherwise. The base case in the model 
is pre_EO since we are interested in the post period. 
The interaction term gives us the difference-in-difference estimation of the 
executive order after the policy is imposed. Since post_EO and non_citizen 
variables are both binary, the value of the interaction term will be 1 if the 
observation is in the post-executive era and belongs to noncitizens. The general 
concept can be seen in Table 4. 
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Table 4.   Difference-in-Difference Estimator    
 
 
Unemployment rate (Warner, 2012) is considered as an important factor in 
the decision of individuals to enlist. If the job opportunities and economic 
conditions in the civilian sector are good enough, individuals will choose to work 
on a civilian job since the probability of injury is high in the military. Because it is 
a strong determinant of the enlistment decision of an individual, we included the 
national monthly unemployment rates in the model. We expected a positive 
correlation between unemployment rates and accessions. When unemployment 
rate is high, the expected number of accessions to the military is also high, and 
vice versa. 
The data is naturally seasonal because different parts of the year yield 
different accession results. Especially in summer time with new graduates from 
high school, the number of accessions increases, while in the winter time, there 
seems to be a noticeable decrease in accessions. We added monthly dummies 
to remove the effect of a predictable seasonal pattern.  
We also conducted separate regressions for each Service to evaluate if 
there is any difference between Services’ noncitizen accessions and their 
effectiveness in recruiting. Since individuals are free to choose the Service in 
which they enlist, some Services might attract more people than other ones. This 
also shows the differences between the Services and even their effectiveness in 
taking advantage of the mentioned EO. The same logic is used while evaluating 
the effect. 
Control Group
(10/1999-07/2002)
Treatment Group
(07/2002-06/2010)
Difference
Pre-EO β0 β0 + β1 (noncit) β1 (noncit)
Post-EO β0 +  β2 (post_EO)
β0 + β1(noncit) +
β2(post_EO) +
β3(post_EO*noncit)
β1(noncit) +
β3(post_EO*noncit)
Difference β2 (post_EO) β2(post_EO) 
+ β3(post_EO*noncit) β3(post_EO*noncit)
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Table 5.   Definition of the Variables 
Variable Description 
Dependent variable 
accessions = number of monthly accessions for citizens and noncitizens in the 
specific month of the year 
Explanatory variables 
Citizenship  
citizen = 1 if the enlistee is citizen; 0 otherwise 
noncitizen = 1 if the enlistee is noncitizen; 0 otherwise 
Pre- and Post-Executive Order 
pre_EO = 1 if the accession date is before 07/2002; 0 otherwise 
post_EO = 1 if the accession date is after 07/2002; 0 otherwise 
Service 
Air Force = number of citizen and noncitizen accessions to Air Force 
separately  
Army = number of citizen and noncitizen accessions to Army separately  
Navy = number of citizen and noncitizen accessions to Navy separately  
Marine corps = number of citizen and noncitizen accessions to Marine Corps 
separately 
Coastguard = number of citizen and noncitizen accessions to Coastguard 
separately  
Unemployment Rate 
Unemp_rate = national monthly unemployment rates 
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V. RESULTS 
We conducted separate regressions for the noncitizen accessions to the 
military and the Services. After setting up the model, we tested for 
heteroscedasticity by using both White and Breusch-Pagan Tests (Woolridge, 
2009). The test results showed that there was significant heteroscedasticy in the 
model. The problem with the model was that the dependent variable (accessions) 
had small values for noncitizen accessions and large values for citizen 
accessions. We used a transformed dependent variable with log-level regression 
and robust standard errors to handle this problem (Woolridge, 2009). 
The log-level model specified in the methodology chapter is called semi-
logarithmic regression because all the explanatory variables are binary and the 
dependent variable is transformed (Giles, 2011). The interpretation of coefficients 
in a semi-logarithmic regression differs from the interpretation of OLS regression 
coefficients (Giles, 2011). The actual magnitude of the coefficients is calculated 
by using the formula 100(exp(  (Woolridge, 2009) .   
A. MILITARY ACCESSIONS 
For the total military noncitizen accessions model, we conducted four 
different regressions including different control variables. The number of 
observations in the aggregated data was 258. We were mainly concerned about 
the coefficient of the interaction term (post*noncitizen), which gave us the DD 
estimation. Table 6 shows the results of the regressions for total noncitizen 
accessions to the military.  
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Table 6.   Military Noncitizen Accessions Regression Results 
 1 The numbers in the brackets are actual percentage magnitudes of the coefficients calculated with the 
formula 100*(exp()-1).  
2 Regression (2) includes unemployment rate as a control variable. 
3 Regression (3) includes monthly dummies as a control variable. 
4 Regression (4) includes unemployment rate and monthly dummies as control variables. 
  
Regression (1) showed the results for the model that had no control 
variables. On average, noncitizen accessions were nearly 96% less than citizen 
accessions, holding other factors constant. Although statistically insignificant, the 
accessions dropped by about 5% in the post-EO period. On average, noncitizens 
accessed 16% less after the EO, holding other factors constant.  
In Regression (2), we included national monthly unemployment rates 
extracted from CPS website. As explained in the methodology chapter, 
unemployment rate is an important determinant in decision to enlist. The results 
showed no significant change after including the unemployment rates.  
In Regression (3), we accounted for the seasonality that the data showed 
naturally. We added monthly dummies to eliminate the seasonal pattern in the 
regression and then the post-EO accessions became statistically significant. On 
average, after the implementation of the EO, accessions dropped nearly 7%, 
holding other factors constant. We discuss some of the reasons for this decrease 
-3.113*** -3.113*** -3.113*** -3.113***
(0.0809) (0.0810) (0.0322) (0.0318)
[-95.55]1 [-95.55] [-95.55] [-95.55]
-0.0467 -0.0545 -0.0723*** -0.0879***
(0.0643) (0.0672) (0.0254) (0.0272)
[-4.56] [-5.31] [-6.97] [-8.41]
-0.177* -0.177* -0.177*** -0.177***
(0.0916) (0.0917) (0.0406) (0.0402)
[-16.22] [-16.22] [-16.22] [-16.22]
9.596*** 9.572*** 9.803*** 9.756***
(0.0574) (0.0754) (0.0368) (0.0520)
Observations 258 258 258 258
R-squared 0.966 0.966 0.991 0.991
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(2)2 (3)3 (4)4
noncitizen
post EO
noncitizen*post EO
Constant
Variables (1)
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in the discussion section. The noncitizen accessions after the EO then became 
more significant (p < 0.01) but the magnitude stayed the same, as 16% less. 
In Regression (4), we included both national monthly unemployment rates 
and monthly dummies in the regression. After that, all the coefficients were 
significant at the 99% confidence interval. Although post–noncitizen accessions 
stayed the same as in previous regressions, post-EO accessions decreased to  
-8.41%. Again on average, noncitizens accessed 16% less in the post-EO period. 
B. SERVICE ACCESSIONS 
We also conducted separate regressions for the Services. The reason that 
we are interested in Service accessions, separately, is that nearly 40% of 
accessions occur in the Army, as can be seen from descriptive statistics. So the 
Army accessions affect the results more than other Service accessions. Also, the 
Services have their own recruiting offices and policies. Some Services might 
have a special interest in recruiting noncitizens, while others may not. Also, 
individuals might be more interested in some Services than in others. In the 
service accession models, we included both national monthly unemployment 
rates and monthly dummies as control variables. The problem with 
heteroscedasticty also occurred with the Service accession models. We used 
semi-logarithmic regressions with robust standard errors as in the military 
accession model. Table 7 shows the results for Service accession models. 
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Table 7.   Service Noncitizen Accessions Regression Results 
 1 Service regressions include unemployment rate and monthly dummies as control variables. 
2 The numbers in the brackets are actual magnitudes of the coefficients calculated with the formula 
100*(exp()-1). 
 
The Army had the largest share in both citizen and noncitizen accessions 
but the results were not statistically significant. Insignificant results showed that 
in the post-EO period, accessions increased around 1.5% but noncitizen 
accessions dropped about 10%.  
All the coefficients in the Air Force accession model were statistically 
significant at the 99% confidence interval. After the implementation of the EO, on 
average, accessions dropped 17.22%, holding other factors constant. Noncitizen 
accessions showed a large decrease of about 24%.  
Navy accessions showed a similar trend with the Air Force accessions. 
There was a nearly 25% decrease in overall accessions after the implementation 
of the EO. On average, noncitizen accessions after the EO were nearly 9% less, 
holding other factors fixed. 
For the Marines, there seemed to be about a 15% increase in the 
accessions in the post-EO period, but noncitizen accession dropped by nearly 
32%, which is very interesting for us. This might be due to noncitizens’ 
perceptions about a combatant Service. Since the implementation of the EO 
-3.190*** -3.613*** -2.885*** -2.910*** -4.518***
(0.111) (0.0479) (0.0356) (0.0323) (0.0954)
[-95.88]2 [-97.30] [-94.41] [-94.55] [-98.91]
0.0140 -0.189*** -0.281*** 0.142*** -0.0211
(0.0827) (0.0462) (0.0280) (0.0283) (0.0639)
[1.41] [-17.22] [-24.50] [15.26] [-2.09]
-0.0994 -0.275*** -0.0934** -0.384*** 0.466***
(0.132) (0.0695) (0.0472) (0.0432) (0.115)
[-9.46] [-24.04] [-8.92] [-31.89] [59.36]
8.787*** 7.998*** 8.229*** 8.198*** 6.301***
(0.111) (0.0882) (0.0528) (0.0649) (0.140)
Observations 258 258 258 258 256
R-squared 0.935 0.975 0.984 0.988 0.963
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
non_citizen
post_EO
non_citizen_post_EO
Constant
Variables ARMY1 AIR FORCE NAVY MARINE COAST GUARD
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coincided with the War on Afghanistan, the probability of dying on the frontline 
might have affected the noncitizens’ decisions to enlist.  
Coast Guard accessions showed a slight decrease of 2% after the EO 
period, but for the noncitizens, there was a significant increase of nearly 60%. 
The increase for the noncitizens might seem very large, but considering the 
relatively small size of the Coast Guard and the average noncitizen accessions 
per months (5.4 individual), this finding did not seem to be significant for our 
research purposes. 
In conclusion, there was a decrease in all Service accessions in the post-
EO period, except for in the Marines. This might be due to the Services’ end 
strength goals. On average, noncitizens accessed about 16% less in the same 
period. Except for the Coast Guard, which showed about a 60% increase, 
noncitizen accessions dropped, changing from 9% (Navy) to 32% (Marine).  
C. JOINT-HYPOTHESIS TEST AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MODELS 
An F test was used to determine the joint significance of the variables in 
the model (Woolridge, 2009). We tested for the significance of the variables post, 
noncitizen, and noncitizen*post in each model to see if they were jointly 
significant. We also presented R square results of the models to measure the 
percentage of the variation in the dependent variable depending on the changes 
in the explanatory variables (Woolridge, 2009). Table 8 shows the test results. 
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Table 8.   The Authors’ R Square and F Test Results of DMDC Data 
 
 
In every model, the explanatory variables were jointly significant and the 
explanatory variables explained more than 90% of the variation in the dependent 
variable. 
D. DISCUSSIONS 
We conducted our regression analyses relying on the fact that both 
citizens and noncitizens have similar incentives to join the military and recruiters 
do not have any discrimination in recruiting from the two separate groups. Based 
on these assumptions, the results of the analyses showed that noncitizen 
accessions declined significantly for all accessions and for the Services, except 
Model F Test R Square
(1)   F(  3,   254) = 2464.20              Prob > F =    0.0000  
0.966
(2) F(  3,   253) = 2456.49              Prob > F =    0.0000  0.966
(3) F(  3,   243) = 9222.05            Prob > F =    0.0000
0.991
(4)  F(  3,   242) = 9168.78               Prob > F =    0.0000  
0.991
Army F(  3,   242) = 1019.88              Prob > F =    0.0000  0.935
Air Force F(  3,   242) = 3918.80              Prob > F =    0.0000  
0.975
Navy F(  3,   242) = 5413.66            Prob > F =    0.0000 0.984
Marine  F(  3,   242) = 7104.92              Prob > F =    0.0000  0.988
Coast Guard F(  3,   240) = 2084.68              Prob > F =    0.0000  
0.963
Identification of Test Results
Reject the null. The variables 
are jointly significant.
Reject the null. The variables 
are jointly significant.
Reject the null. The variables 
are jointly significant.
Reject the null. The variables 
are jointly significant.
Reject the null. The variables 
are jointly significant.
Reject the null. The variables 
are jointly significant.
Reject the null. The variables 
are jointly significant.
Reject the null. The variables 
are jointly significant.
Reject the null. The variables 
are jointly significant.
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for the Army and Coast Guard, relative to their citizen counterparts after EO 
13269 was issued. In this section, we present our comments on these results. 
First, we thought that this EO was enacted to attract more noncitizens and 
expand the recruitment pool for the Services. From the results of the analyses, 
we can easily say that the EO failed to achieve this goal. Since we are interested 
in the effectiveness of the EO and the effectiveness of the EO can be evaluated 
by the achievement of predetermined objectives and unconsidered outcomes, 
the question of better identifying the goals emerged after seeing the results. The 
effectiveness of the EO can be evaluated by subtracting the total costs from the 
total benefits. The goals and expected outcomes of the EO were not stated 
anywhere in the documents, including laws and publications Therefore, the 
purpose of the EO has been a matter for discussion. Considering this and the 
results of the analyses, we thought that we might have made a mistake about the 
goal of the EO and tried to figure out what other objectives might have been put 
forth while making the decision to pass this EO.   
First, the EO might have been issued just to award the service of 
noncitizens, with no considerations of the recruitment policies. With the start of 
the Global War on Terror, followed by the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, the 
number of casualties increased in the U.S. military. Obviously, the conditions are 
not the same as in peacetime conditions. The enactment of the EO might have 
focused on the suffering of noncitizen Service members and aimed to increase 
their motivation and dedication during these hostile conditions. Therefore, it might 
have been meant to focus on the current Service members, not the potential 
ones. For this purpose, the performance improvement of noncitizens after the 
implementation of the EO should be researched to see its effect.  
Another objective of the EO might have been to make the U.S. public and 
the international community aware of the engagement of the U.S. Armed Forces 
in a hostile conflict through a legal document. The states of the world, as 
members of the international community, use several ways to show their 
intentions. These methods include direct and indirect methods. One state can 
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recognize another state by issuing a declaration stating the recognition directly or 
can interact with that state within international law to show the recognition 
indirectly. The enactment of the EO might have focused on gathering the 
attention of the public inside and outside of the U.S. and prepare bases for the 
upcoming engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. So, the effectiveness of the EO 
in accomplishing this purpose should also be considered when evaluating the 
overall effectiveness of the EO. 
We mentioned two additional probable objectives for the enactment of the 
EO. These are the objectives that we determined ourselves; however, there may 
be additional ones. For a better analysis of the success of the EO, the 
contributions of all the scenarios should be considered in a wholistic approach. 
Benefits from one scenario might compensate for the disadvantages of the other.  
After briefly debating on the alternative objectives of the EO, we focus 
back on our first assumption that evaluates the effectiveness of the EO regarding 
the change in the number of accessions. We found that the EO had a negative 
effect on the number of noncitizen accessions. So, there should be something 
significantly related to the EO that reduced the motivation of noncitizens to enlist, 
when compared to citizens.  
One reason that the EO had a negative effect on the number of noncitizen 
accessions could be the publication of war conditions. Once noncitizens became 
more aware of hostile conditions that the armed forces were engaged in and the 
greater risks involved in serving in those times, they might have become less 
eager to make a sacrifice for a country of which they were not even citizens. It is 
generally considered an honor to serve for one’s country and to make a sacrifice 
for it. Citizen soldiers most likely consider this motivation when making enlistment 
decisions. They know that they have all the benefits of being a citizen and that 
their family members and beloved friends and relatives will benefit from their 
service4. The well-being of their country also means the well-being of the people 
                                            
4 Naturalized citizens should be considered an exception to this comment. 
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surrounding them. In addition, they will be praised by those people for their 
service. On the other hand, most of the time, noncitizen soldiers with roots from 
another country are alone in the U.S. or possibly with some immediate relatives 
who do not have the benefits of citizenship. The rest of the people they care 
about might be located outside the U.S. They might even be considered to be 
betraying their own countries by joining another country’s armed forces, rather 
than being praised for this decision. In peacetime conditions, noncitizens might 
join the military as an occupation and as a way to survive. In wartime conditions, 
as revealed by the EO, their motivation to enlist might be reduced, considering 
the relative disadvantages of making a sacrifice for the country. 
Another reason that the EO had a negative effect on the number of 
noncitizen accessions could be the publication of casualties following the Afghan 
and Iraq wars and the significant number of documents available on the web and 
social media about the use of noncitizens as “cannon fodder” in the Afghanistan 
and Iraq wars. Though it cannot be proved, this might have affected enlistment 
decisions of the noncitizens.  
One other reason for the negative effect of the EO could also be the 
perceived benefits of the executive order. The only substantial benefit of the 
executive order is less time spent on attaining citizenship. In the absence of the 
executive order, according to current legislation, a service member needs to 
serve for one year before filing an application for citizenship. A service member 
might not care about this because he signs a contract for at least four years at 
the time of enlistment. The average time to attain citizenship after filing an 
application is similar for all service members. Therefore, one year less to attain 
citizenship might not be a valuable benefit for noncitizens. Also, the executive 
order does not bring any direct benefits to the family members of the noncitizen. 
The family members will become eligible for citizenship after the service member 
attains citizenship, either under the provisions of the executive order or not. The 
family members must follow the usual procedures to apply for citizenship, and 
the requirements for such citizenship takes a long time. 
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Finally, the official and unofficial changes in the recruitment policies of the 
Services and the changes in the recruiting ways of the recruiters can be another 
reason or the negative effect of the EO. After the EO, the Services might have 
been more inclined to recruit citizens rather than noncitizens relying on  the idea 
that the soldiers who will do their best to defend their countries in times of 
hardship will be citizen soldiers. Relatively more paperwork is involved in 
recruiting noncitizens, which might also have discouraged recruiters from 
recruiting more noncitizens, though there is no specific evidence of this.   
After finding that the results were not compatible with our expectations,  
we also questioned our method of analysis. The assumption that the enlistment 
motivations of citizens and noncitizens are the same might not be completely 
correct. Although there are similarities in many aspects, any dissimilar 
motivations not included in the model might have biased the results. This casts a 
question on the accuracy of the interpretation of this analysis.  
Our study evaluated the number of accessions by using accession data. 
This kind of data restricted us from using data on the unaccessed applicants and 
even the overall eligible population. What if the population of eligible noncitizens 
decreased throughout the time covered in our analyses, or what if the eligible 
citizen population increased much more than the eligible noncitizen population? 
We know that the immigrant population is growing in the U.S., but this might not 
be proportionate to the growth of the enlistment-eligible population. Although very 
small, there is a possibility that the percentage of noncitizen accessions in the 
eligible population either increased or remained at similar levels during this time 
after accounting for the eligible citizen and noncitizen population. This question 
cannot be answered without specifying the enlistment-eligible noncitizen 
population.  
We thought that the awareness of the EO would be the most important 
factor for the EO to have an affect on noncitizen accessions. In order to find how 
much the implementation of the EO was advertised and debated in society, we 
decided to look into news articles published in the U.S.’s written media. We used 
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the Lexis Nexis Database for this research and searched different keywords that 
would be relevant to the content of the EO, in the time period between one year 
before and three years after the EO. We found that the keywords Expedited 
Citizenship and Military returned the most relevant results. Due to the very low 
number of articles from this search, we expanded our search to the secondary 
keywords—Naturalization and Military and Citizenship and Military. To be able to 
understand the magnitude of the published news articles by using the above 
keywords, we decided to compare them with a general keyword, U.S. Military. 
Figure 8 represents the results of this research. The results basically showed that 
the EO was not promoted enough to create countrywide awareness.  
 
Figure 8.  Number of News Articles in U.S. Newspapers and Wires by Different 
Keywords  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
Especially in wartimes, the manpower needs of the armed forces of a 
country reach the highest point. Although in some cases, technology has 
replaced manpower in the modern world, the importance of manpower cannot be 
ignored. In U.S. history, the reward of citizenship in return for military service has 
become an important tool for policy makers. As explained in the background 
chapter, citizenship has beeen used to attract more people to meet the needs of 
the armed forces and to reward noncitizens for their honorable service, beginning 
with the Revolutionary War. Many acts of legislation and executive orders have 
been passed through Congress and signed by U.S. presidents. 
Noncitizens provide important characteristics to the armed forces of the 
U.S. There is an increased need for noncitizens in the military, considering the 
diverse backgrounds, foreign language abilities, and better adaptibility to the 
military environment of noncitizens; the growing immigrant population within the 
U.S.; the challenges facing the armed forces in recruiting qualified manpower; 
and the role of the U.S. military around the world.  
The U.S. is also aware of the importance of noncitizens and President 
Bush signed an executive order allowing active-duty noncitizens to receive 
expedited citizenship, even after one day of honorable service. The amendment 
to the NDAA (2003) in 2004 also reduced the peacetime waiting period to one 
year for active-duty noncitizens. 
In this study, we wanted to evaluate the effect of the recent Executive 
Order 13269 on noncitizen accessions to the military. We started with the 
question “Did the reward of citizenship accomplish the expected outcome and 
attract more noncitizens to the armed forces?.” We used an OLS regression with 
difference-in-difference estimation. Citizen accessions were set up as a control 
group and noncitizen accessions were the treatment group. Our regression 
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analyses results showed that, for the military, after the implementation of the 
executive order, noncitizen accessions dropped by 16%. In the same period, 
accessions dropped by 8.41%. 
Service-related accessions showed a similar trend. In the post-EO period, 
accessions dropped by 17.22%, 24.50%, and 2.09% for the Air Force, Navy, and 
Coast Guard, respectively. The Marines were the exception: Marines accesions 
showed an increase of 15.26%. When we looked at noncitizen accessions after 
the implemantation of the EO, Air Force accessions dropped by 24.04%, Navy 
accessions dropped by 8.92%, and Marine accessions dropped by 31.89%. In 
contrast, Coast Guard accessions showed an increase of 59.36%. This large 
increase was not meaningful in our research because the average noncitizen 
accession to the Coast Guard was only about 5 individuals per month. For the 
Army, the results were insignificant. 
It is obvious that after the implementation of the EO, noncitizen 
accessions dropped significantly. In the results chapter, we discussed the 
potential reasons for this outcome, but statiscally significant results showed that 
the EO did not work, as far as increasing noncitizen accessions.  
B. RECOMMENDATİONS 
We have observed that there are some factors that affected the noncitizen 
accessions negatively more than the EO. Our key recommendations from the 
analysis are listed as follows: 
 The Services should establish an effective way of recruiting 
noncitizens because the study made by McIntosh, Sayala, and 
Gregory (2011) found that recruiters have no special interest in 
recruiting noncitizens. Recruiters in the armed forces could be 
briefed about the EO and its benefits to noncitizens. 
 The advertisement of the EO does not seem to be enough to 
capture public attention. Our findings show that the EO is not 
discussed within society enough because the number of news 
articles related to the EO was very small. Even most Internet 
sources named the EO as a tool to find “cannon fodders” for the 
ongoing wars in which the U.S. is involved. 
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 The benefits provided to eligible noncitizens should be broadened 
to include the family members of noncitizens. The family members 
would become eligible for citizenship after the service member 
attains citizenship. The family members must follow the usual 
procedures to apply for citizenship, and the requirements for such 
citizenship takes a long time.  
 Legal Permanent Residency is a requirement to apply for 
enlistment. If the requirement for LPR could be eliminated, even for 
undocumented noncitizens to become eligible for enlistment, the 
applicant pool would be greater than the current one.  
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 The DMDC data did not extend far enough back in time before the 
EO. Expanding the time period before the executive order will 
probably yield better results. 
 We could not find a study about the motivations of active-duty 
noncitizens. Determining the effects of noncitizens’ decisions to 
enlist to the military would help to better understand them and their 
priorities. 
 A survey could be conducted about the perception of the EO 
amongst noncitizens to better understand the policy and its 
implications. 
 
 52
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 
 
 
 53
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1840 fast facts. (2012). Retrieved from U.S. Census Bureau website: 
http://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/1840
_fast_facts.html 
Adams, G. (2007, April 1). The U.S. military’s growing role in foreign policy. 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Retrieved from 
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/gordon-adams/the-us-
military%E2%80%99s-growing-role-foreign-policy 
A guide to naturalization. (2012, March). Retrieved from U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services website: http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/M-476.pdf 
Chu, D. S. (2006). Prepared statement of the Honorable David S. C. Chu, Under 
Secretary of Defense(Personnel and Readiness) before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee. Retrieved from http://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2006/July/Chu%2007–10–06.pdf 
Citizenship for military members. (2010, July 22). Retrieved from U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services website: 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c
6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=ce613e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aR
CRD&vgnextchannel=ce613e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCR
D 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). (2006). Recruiting, retention, and future 
levels of military personnel (CBO-2777). Retrieved from 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7626/10–
05-recruiting.pdf 
Current population survey—March 2010 detailed tables. (2012). Retrieved from 
U.S. Census Bureau website: 
http://www.census.gov/population/foreign/data/cps2010.html 
Cyrulik, J. M. (2004). Expanding the United States Army for 21st century roles 
and missions: Foreign legion or foreign augmentation? [Monograph]. 
Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA429154&amp;Location=U2&amp;doc=GetTRDoc.
pdf 
Dale, C., & Gilroy, C. (1984). Determinants of enlistment: A macroeconomic time-
series view. Armed Forces & Society, 10(2), 202. 
 54
DeSipio, L., & de la Garza, R. O. (1998). Making Americans, remaking America. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Development, Relief, and Education Act for Alien Minors (DREAM Act), S. 1291, 
107th Cong. (2001).Diversity Visa (DV) Program. (1995, February). 
Retrieved from 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_5561.html 
Exec. Order (EO) No. 12081, 43 FR 42237 (1978, September 18). 
Exec. Order (EO) No. 12939, 59 FR 61231 (1994, November 22). 
Exec. Order (EO) No. 13269, 67 FR 45287 (2002, July 3). 
Franklin, F. G. (1906). The legislative history of naturalization in the United 
States. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Gibson, C., & Jung, K. (2011). Historical census statistics on the foreign-born 
population of the United States: 1850–2000. Retrieved from U.S. Census 
Bureau website: 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0081/twps008
1.html 
Giles, D. E. (2011, January). Interpreting dummy variables in semi-logarithmic 
regression models: Exact distributional results (EWP1101). Retrieved from 
University of Victoria website: 
http://web.uvic.ca/~dgiles/downloads/working_papers/ewp1101.pdf 
Gilmore, G. J. (2008, December 5). Military recruits non-citizen healthcare 
workers, linguists. American Forces Press Service. Retrieved from U.S. 
Department of Defense website: 
http://www.defense.gov/News/newsarticle.aspx?id=52208 
Goring, D. C. (2011). In service to America: Naturalization of undocumented alien 
veterans. Seton Hall Law Review, 31(2). 
Immigration to the United States, 1789–1930. (n.d.). Retrieved from Harvard 
University Library Open Collections Program: 
http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/immigration/timeline.html 
Hattiangadi, A. U., Quester, A. O., Lee, G., Lien, D. S., & MacLeod, I. D. (with 
Reese, D. L., & Shuford, R. W.). (2005). Non-citizens in today’s military: 
Final report. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses. 
 
 
 55
Hoefer, M., Rytina, N., & Baker, B. (2012, 3). Estimates of the unauthorized 
immigrant population residing in the United States: January 2011. 
Retrieved from Department of Homeland Security website: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.p
df 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. ch. 12 (1996).  
Jacobs, J. B., & Hayes, L. A. (1981). Aliens in the U.S. Armed Forces. Armed 
Forces & Society, 7(2), 187–208. 
Lee, J. (2012, April). Annual flow report: U.S. naturalizations 2011. Retrieved 
from Department of Homeland Security website: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/natz_fr_2011.pdf 
Lee , M. M., & Wasem , R. E. (2009). Expedited citizenship through military 
service: Current law, policy and issues (RL31884). Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service. 
Malfatti-Rachell, G. (2008). Expedited citizenship for immigrant soldier: Tribute or 
bounty. Retrieved from Forum on Public Policy website: 
http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/summer08papers/archivesummer08/malfat
ti.rachell.pdf 
McIntosh, M. F., Sayala, S., & Gregory, D. (2011). Non-citizens in the enlisted 
U.S. military. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses. 
Miller, W. B., & Auerbach, F. L. (1948). Foreign born in the United States Army 
during World War II, with special reference to the alien. New York, NY: 
Common Council for American Unity. 
Monger, R., & Yankay, J. (2012, April). Annual flow report: U.S. legal permanent 
residents 2011. Retrieved from Department of Homeland Security website: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/lpr_fr_2011.pdf 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108–136, § 1701, 117 Stat. 1392 (2003). 
Naturalization through military service: Fact sheet. (2011, November 04). 
Retrieved from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services website: 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f6141
76543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=26d805a25c4c4210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRC
RD 
O’Neil, L. G., & Senturk, O. S. (2004). Noncitizens in the U.S. Military (Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School). Retrieved from 
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2004/Mar/04Mar_ONeil.pdf 
 56
Other ways to get a green card [Table]. (2013, January 18). Retrieved from U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services website: 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c
6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=5a97a6c515083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aR
CRD&vgnextchannel=5a97a6c515083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCR
D 
Path to U.S. citizenship. (2013, January 22). Retrieved from U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services website: 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c
6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextchannel=86bd6811264a3210VgnVCM100000b92ca
60aRCRD 
Plascencia, L. F. (2009, May). Citizenship through veteranship: Latino migrants 
defend the U.S. “Homeland.” Anthropology News, 8–9. 
Posthumuous citizenship. (2011, July 7). Retrieved from Army National Guard 
G1 Personnel Gateway website: 
https://g1arng.army.pentagon.mil/programs/posthumouscitizenship/pages/
default.aspx 
Preston, J. (2009, February 14). U.S. military will offer path to citizenship. The 
New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/us/15immig.html?pagewanted=all&_r
=0 
Singer, A. (n.d.). A brief history of immigration to the United States. Retrieved 
from 
http://people.hofstra.edu/alan_j_singer/294%20Course%20Pack/6.%20Im
migration/115.pdf 
Smith, M. L. (2009). Overview of INS history to 1998. Retrieved from U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services website: 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f6141
76543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=b7294b0738f70110VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRC
RD&vgnextchannel=bc9cc9b1b49ea110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD 
Stock, M. D. (2006). The DREAM Act. Bender’s Immigration Bulletin, 64–67. 
Stock, M. D. (2009). Essential to the fight: Immigrants in the military eight years 
after 9/11 [Special report]. Retrieved from Immigration Policy Center 
website: 
http://immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Immigrants_in_the_Milit
ary_-_Stock_110909_0.pdf 
The number of green cards. (1999). Retrieved from 
http://www.myvisa.com/Visasage/PRnumber.htm 
 57
Total number of DV lottery applicants by country [Table]. (2012). Retrieved from 
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/DV_Applicant_Entrants_by_Country_2007–
2013.pdf 
United States immigration before 1965. (1996–2013). Retrieved from 
http://www.history.com/topics/united-states-immigration-to-1965 
U.S. Army “wants more immigrants.” (2009, February 15). BBC News. Retrieved 
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7891222.stm?lss 
Visa bulletin for June 2011. (2011, May 11). Retrieved from 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5452.html 
Warner, J. T. (2012). 11th quadrennial review of military compensation. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
Weigley, R. F. (1967). History of the United States Army. New York, NY: 
Macmillan. 
Wong, C., & Cho, G. (2007). Jus meritum citizenship for service. In T. Lee, S. 
Ramakrishnan, & R. Ramirez (Eds.), Transforming politics, transforming 
America (pp. 71–88). Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press. 
Woolridge, J. M. (2009). Introductory econometrics: A modern approach. Mason, 
OH: CENGAGE Learning. 
 
 58
THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK 
 59
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
3. Professor Jesse M. Cunha 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
4. Professor Ryan Sullivan 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California  
  
5. Jandarma Okullar Komutanlığı Kütüphanesi 
Jandarma Okullar Komutanlığı 
Beytepe, Ankara, Türkiye 
 
6.  Kara Harp Okulu Enstitüsü 
Kara Harp Okulu 
Bakanlıklar, Ankara, Türkiye  
 
7. Huseyin Yalcinkaya 
Jandarma Okullar Komutanlığı 
Beytepe, Ankara, Türkiye 
 
8.  Melih Can 
Kara Harp Okulu 
Bakanlıklar, Ankara, Türkiye  
